infinifi-protocol
Maximum reward
$100,000
Severity
Max. Reward
Critical$100,000
High$15,000
Deposit required
$50
Findings submitted
348
Start date
8 Jun 2025
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Log inIn scope
Severity
Min and Max Reward
CriticalUp to $100,000
High
Up to $15,000
More redefined core contracts group.
Name | Description | Asset |
|---|---|---|
| CORE | Access control and role registry for the protocol | 0xF6…5490 |
| TIMELOCK_SHORT | Short-duration timelock for governance actions | 0x4B…7c32 |
| TIMELOCK_LONG | Long-duration timelock for governance actions | 0x3D…48a9 |
| FARM_REGISTRY | Registry of all protocol farm allocations | 0xF5…6119 |
| MANUAL_REBALANCER_V2 | Manual rebalancing tool for farm allocations | 0x5f…2777 |
| LOCKING_CONTROLLER | Manages iUSD locking and lock period logic | 0x1d…7fF7 |
| UNWINDING_MODULE | Handles early unwinding of locked positions | 0x70…dFcc |
| ACCOUNTING | Tracks and reconciles protocol asset valuations | 0x7A…42B3 |
| YIELD_SHARING_PROXY | Active yield distribution contract (proxy) | 0x90…AE3b |
| YIELD_SHARING_V3 | Latest yield sharing implementation | 0x0D…07E5 |
| ALLOCATION_VOTING | Governance voting for farm allocation weights | 0x49…F853 |
| MINT_CONTROLLER | Controls iUSD minting parameters and flow | 0x49…C256 |
| REDEEM_CONTROLLER | Controls iUSD redemption parameters and flow | 0xCb…7601 |
| AFTER_MINT_HOOK | Hook executed after iUSD minting | 0xa5…97a8 |
| BEFORE_REDEEM_HOOK | Hook executed before iUSD redemption | 0x4b…1395 |
| GATEWAY_PROXY | Main user-facing entry point for protocol interactions (proxy) | 0x3f…25b5 |
| GATEWAY_IMPLEMENTATION_V3 | Latest gateway implementation | 0xb4…ffB6 |
| GATEWAY_PROXY_ADMIN | Admin contract for gateway proxy upgrades | 0x21…141c |
| UNSTAKE_AND_REDEEM_HELPER | Single-tx helper to unstake siUSD and redeem | 0x4f…9dFE |
| EMERGENCY_WITHDRAWAL | Emergency withdrawal mechanism for protocol funds | 0xa4…26e9 |
| MINOR_ROLES_MANAGER | Manages assignment of minor protocol roles | 0xa0…be9b |
| MATURED_FARM_CLEANER | Cleans up and settles matured/expired farm positions | 0x60…fa56 |
| ORACLE_FACTORY | Factory for deploying protocol oracle contracts | 0xA2…Ed91 |
| MIGRATION_CONTROLLER | Manages contract version migrations | 0x5F…39F8 |
| PL_SMOOTHER | Smooths protocol P&L reporting over time | 0xC3…57A4 |
| PL_SMOOTHER_HELPER | Helper contract for PL smoother calculations | 0x21…10b8 |
| RWA_RATE_MANAGER | Manages interest rates for RWA allocations | 0x11…4189 |
Out of scope
Out-of-Scope Targets:
- Contracts listed in addresses.1.json that are deployed by third parties, like ERC20_USDC, ROUTER_PENDLE, … InfiniFi’s deployer address is 0xdecaDAc8778D088A30eE811b8Cc4eE72cED9Bf22 and all our contracts are verified on Etherscan
- api.infinifi.xyz
- Issues described in previous audit reports (Spearbit, Certora, Cantina), reports are available on our documentation website.
- Ongoing rounding issue with CapFarm
Default Out of Scope:
- Issues found in previous security reviews,
- Third-party contracts not under direct project control,
- Issues with non-standard ERC20 tokens (unless explicitly supported by the project),
- Rounding errors with no significant impact,
- User errors requiring obviously incorrect parameter inputs,
- Vulnerabilities that only manifest during extreme market conditions,
- Incorrect data from third-party oracles
- Note: Oracle manipulation and flash loan attacks are still in scope
- Theoretical exploits without practical proof-of-concept,
- Issues requiring access to leaked keys or credentials,
- Issues arising from Sybil attacks
- Centralization risks
- Basic economic and governance attacks (such as 51% attacks)
- Protocol design choices
- Gas optimization issues and high gas costs
- Best practice suggestions
- Submissions generated using ChatGPT or other LLM tools