BitGo Bug Bounty
Maximum reward
$75,000
Severity
Max. Reward
Critical$75,000
High$37,500
Medium$2,500
Low$1,500
No deposit required
Findings submitted
985
Start date
17 Mar 2026
KYC
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Log inIn scope
Severity
Min and Max Reward
Critical$50,000 to $75,000
High
$35,000 to $37,500
Medium
$2,000 to $2,500
Solidity contract files in both repos, their deployment/integration logic, and contract-level flaws that could affect multisig wallet security, funds management, or permissions.
Contracts are for modern, Ethereum-compatible EVM chains.
If you discover a vulnerability in any component not explicitly listed but which poses a risk to user funds, user data, or system integrity, you may submit it for consideration. Our team will review such submissions on a case-by-case basis.
Special Focus Areas
The bounty will place particular emphasis on, but is not limited to:
- Balancing bugs (fund accounting errors)
- EVM opcode exploit vectors (e.g.,
call,delegatecall,staticcall,selfdestructrisks) - Arithmetic manipulation attacks (such as overflow/underflow or rounding issues leading to fund misallocation)
- Transaction ordering and front-running issues
- Signature-related vulnerabilities that directly impact funds or wallet control
Name | Description | Asset |
|---|---|---|
| eth-multisig-v4 | BitGo ETH Multisig v4 | |
| eth-multisig-v2 | BitGo ETH Multisig v2 |
Out of scope
Eth Multisig Contracts - Out of Scope
The following issues are out of scope and not eligible for rewards under the bug bounty program.
Exceptions apply only if a submission includes a working on-chain proof-of-concept (PoC) that demonstrates real fund loss or unauthorized control on a supported chain deployment.
For generic exclusions, see the Cantina Bug Bounty Out-of-Scope Policy.
Out-of-Scope Chains
- Ethereum Classic (ETC)
- Celo
- Avalanche C-Chain
- Any legacy or non-standard EVM lacking full support for modern Ethereum-compatible opcode semantics (including chain-specific incompatibilities)
Design-Accepted & Trust Assumptions
The following are intentional design choices and are out of scope:
- Centralization or privileged-role risks (e.g., owner-controlled functions in
Batcher.sol) - Trust assumptions involving BitGo-operated multisignature ownership
- Any report assuming malicious behavior by trusted owners, operators, or signers without an authorization bypass
Off-Chain-Enforced Validation
The following validations are enforced off-chain and intentionally omitted on-chain. Reports relying on bypassing these checks are out of scope:
- Zero-address (
address(0)) validation - Wallet signer uniqueness or signer array validation
- Recovery wallet initialization correctness
- Any issue depending on manipulation of BitGo internal systems, APIs, or operational processes
Explicitly Excluded Vulnerability Classes
- Forced ETH deposits via
SELFDESTRUCT: Reports demonstrating forced ETH transfers viaSELFDESTRUCTand subsequent withdrawals, without an exploitable contract logic flaw enabling theft or privilege escalation. - Key reuse across multiple wallets: Issues related to the same address being reused as a signer across multiple wallets.
Informational & Non-Exploitable Issues
- Gas optimizations
- Coding style or readability issues
- Best-practice recommendations without exploitability
- Missing or additional event emissions
- Monitoring, alerting, or observability gaps
EVM Stablecoin Contracts - Out of Scope
The following exclusions apply to the EVM Stablecoin Contracts scope above. For generic exclusions, see the Cantina Bug Bounty Out-of-Scope Policy.
Out of Scope
- Third-party dependencies - report upstream unless the way this repo uses them introduces a novel vulnerability
- Issues requiring a compromised private key for any role holder
- Gas-optimization suggestions
- Front-end, off-chain infra, or deployment-secret handling not present in this repository
PoC exception: a report otherwise excluded above will still be considered if the submission includes a working proof-of-concept demonstrating concrete, exploitable impact beyond the stated exclusion (e.g., a third-party dependency issue that is only reachable and exploitable because of how this contract calls it).
Design-Accepted & Trust Assumptions
- Role holders are trusted within their granted powers
- Off-chain reserve backing for mint/burn
- Storage-layout safety is tooling-enforced, not chain-enforced
- Timelock asymmetry is intentional
Known Issues (Excluded)
- Lack of zero amount validations in functions
- Per-transaction mint cap bypass via batched/multicall submission
- Minter/bridge-minter role config desync via renounceRole
- Blacklist not enforced against the minter/burner msg.sender on mint/burn paths
Explicitly Excluded Vulnerability Classes
- Anything listed under Known Issues above
- Issues requiring a compromised or leaked private key for any role
- Denial of service caused solely by a role holder correctly exercising a role's documented permissions (e.g., FREEZER_ROLE pausing the contract) - this is intended emergency functionality, not an exploit
- Griefing that costs the attacker more in gas than the damage inflicted, with no path to profit or persistent harm
- Best-practice/style suggestions with no demonstrated security impact (e.g., missing indexed on event params, non-security NatSpec inaccuracies)
Informational & Non-Exploitable Issues
Findings that are technically correct observations but have no demonstrated path to loss of funds, unauthorized privilege, or availability impact will be accepted as informational acknowledgments but are not eligible for a reward tier.