Kuru Bug Bounty
Maximum reward
$50,000
Severity
Max. Reward
Critical$50,000
High$25,000
Medium$5,000
No deposit required
Findings submitted
101
Start date
24 Nov 2025
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Log inIn scope
Severity
Min and Max Reward
CriticalUp to $50,000
High
Up to $25,000
Medium
Up to $5,000
LowDiscretionary
Mainnet smart contract addresses for Kuru deployed on Monad.
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Source of truth:
- Deployed on-chain contracts are final and GitHub is reference-only except for Kuru Active Vaults.
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Documentation link - https://docs.kuru.io/contracts/Architecture-overview
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Audit links - https://docs.kuru.io/contracts/Audits
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Github links for reference:
Name | Description | Asset |
|---|---|---|
| KuruFlowEntrypoint | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xb3…13cb |
| KuruFlowRouter | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0x46…7040 |
| KuruAMMVaultImpl | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xDC…70F4 |
| KuruForwarder | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0x97…3FAA |
| KuruForwarderImpl | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xbf…Fe2A |
| KuruUtils | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xD8…27f6 |
| MarginAccount | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0x2A…90c5 |
| MarginAccountImpl | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0x57…0ca7 |
| MonadDeployer | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xe2…7D1E |
| OrderBookImpl | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xea…23CD |
| Router | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0xd6…95CC |
| RouterImpl | In-scope smart contract address on mainnet. | 0x0F…A9CD |
Out of scope
Out of Scope
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Vault DOS with low liquidity
- The vault can be DOSed at very low liquidity where it becomes infeasible to place taker orders or place liquidity at a desired price.
- This is a known issue and at low available sizes, the orderbook stops routing through the AMM vault. This is a known and accepted issue.
- The market deployer is responsible for setting the initial liquidity and should be aware of this limitation.
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Issues from badly set market parameters
- Issues arising from badly set market parameters are not in scope. The market deployer is responsible for choosing appropriate parameters as it is difficult to set the same without price information.
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Market DOS by bypassing minimum order size through flip orders
- A market can be temporarily DOSed by bypassing the minimum order size through filling flip orders.
- However, this is difficult to perform in an actively trading market and requires a large amount of funds to be locked up.
- Therefore, this issue is out of scope.
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Price oracle related issues in KuruForwarder
- The price dependent requests in KuruForwarder does a direct check on the price of the market instead of relying on a TWAP oracle.
- This is known and accepted, the responsibility of fulfilling EIP712 requests lies with the user or customized relayer. Similarly, the kind of price comparisons made in the price dependent requests are intentional.