Kuru Bug Bounty

Kuru Bug Bounty

@kurulabs
Live

Maximum reward

$50,000

Severity

Max. Reward

Critical

$50,000

High

$25,000

Medium

$5,000

No deposit required

Findings submitted

101

Start date

24 Nov 2025

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In scope

Severity

Min and Max Reward

Critical

Up to $50,000


High

Up to $25,000


Medium

Up to $5,000


Low
Discretionary

Mainnet smart contract addresses for Kuru deployed on Monad.

Name
Description
Asset
KuruFlowEntrypoint

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xb3…13cb

KuruFlowRouter

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0x46…7040

KuruAMMVaultImpl

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xDC…70F4

KuruForwarder

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0x97…3FAA

KuruForwarderImpl

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xbf…Fe2A

KuruUtils

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xD8…27f6

MarginAccount

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0x2A…90c5

MarginAccountImpl

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0x57…0ca7

MonadDeployer

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xe2…7D1E

OrderBookImpl

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xea…23CD

Router

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0xd6…95CC

RouterImpl

In-scope smart contract address on mainnet.

0x0F…A9CD

Out of scope

Out of Scope

  • Vault DOS with low liquidity

    • The vault can be DOSed at very low liquidity where it becomes infeasible to place taker orders or place liquidity at a desired price.
    • This is a known issue and at low available sizes, the orderbook stops routing through the AMM vault. This is a known and accepted issue.
    • The market deployer is responsible for setting the initial liquidity and should be aware of this limitation.
  • Issues from badly set market parameters

    • Issues arising from badly set market parameters are not in scope. The market deployer is responsible for choosing appropriate parameters as it is difficult to set the same without price information.
  • Market DOS by bypassing minimum order size through flip orders

    • A market can be temporarily DOSed by bypassing the minimum order size through filling flip orders.
    • However, this is difficult to perform in an actively trading market and requires a large amount of funds to be locked up.
    • Therefore, this issue is out of scope.
  • Price oracle related issues in KuruForwarder

    • The price dependent requests in KuruForwarder does a direct check on the price of the market instead of relying on a TWAP oracle.
    • This is known and accepted, the responsibility of fulfilling EIP712 requests lies with the user or customized relayer. Similarly, the kind of price comparisons made in the price dependent requests are intentional.