Echo

Echo: Gensyn Token Sale

Cantina Security Report

Organization

@echo

Engagement Type

Cantina Reviews

Period

-

Researchers

Om Parikh

rvierdiiev

Findings

Low Risk

1 findings

0 fixed

1 acknowledged

Informational

3 findings

3 fixed

0 acknowledged

Low Risk1 finding

  1. recoverTokens allows to withdraw commitment tokens

    State

    Acknowledged

    Severity

    Severity: Low

    ≈

    Likelihood: Low

    ×

    Impact: Low

    Submitted by

    rvierdiiev

    Description

    Currently the recoverTokens() function does not restrict which tokens can be recovered. As a result, an account with the TOKEN_RECOVERER_ROLE can withdraw USDT and USDC, which are the core commitment tokens used by the protocol.

    Recommendation

    Add validation ensuring that commitment tokens (e.g., USDT and USDC) cannot be recovered through recoverTokens(). Only non-core, mistakenly sent tokens should be recoverable by the TOKEN_RECOVERER_ROLE.

Informational3 findings

  1. Remove redundant errors

    State

    Fixed

    PR #2

    Severity

    Severity: Informational

    ≈

    Likelihood: Low

    ×

    Impact: Low

    Submitted by

    rvierdiiev

    Description

    error ZeroPrice();error MaxAddressesPerEntityExceeded

    Those errors are never used in the code base.

    Recommendation

    Remove redundant errors.

  2. Differences between comments and the code

    State

    Fixed

    PR #2

    Severity

    Severity: Informational

    ≈

    Likelihood: Low

    ×

    Impact: Low

    Submitted by

    rvierdiiev

    Description

    According to the comments:

    Bids must satisfy monotonic constraints: amounts and prices can only increase, and lockup preferences can be enabled but cannot be disabled once set.

    However, the implementation only enforces that the new bid's amount and price are not lower than the previous bid. This means a user can submit a bid where both the amount and price are exactly the same as the previous one.

    Recommendation

    Require both amount and price to be strictly greater than the previous bid’s values.

  3. EIP-2612 permit signatures can be front-run for replaceBidWithPermit

    State

    Fixed

    PR #2

    Severity

    Severity: Informational

    Submitted by

    Om Parikh

    Description

    An adversary can extract permit signature from mempool and front-run to submit directly to ERC-20 contract, so pToken.permit would revert later when original transaction lands with same permit sig.

    however, since there is replaceBidWithApproval is present, this doesn't lead to complete DOS.

    Recommendation

    • add a try / catch around permit, so that even if permit reverts, it can be ignored and proceed with transfering
    • frontend must ensure replaceBidWithApproval is used as fallback if replaceBidWithPermit keeps reverting